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AN ITALIAN INFORMATION AGENT 
IN THE HUNGARIAN THEATRE OF WAR: 
LUIGI FERDINANDO MARSIGLI 
BETWEEN VIENNA AND CONSTANTINOPLE 
MÓNIKA F. MOLNÁR 
 
 
 
In researching the life and works1 of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (Bologna, 
1658–Bologna, 1730), focus can be placed on several aspects depending 
on the interests of the given researcher. The Count of Bologna was a sol-
dier2 (he dubbed himself: miles sum), a talented military engineer, a dip-
lomat3 and a scientist miles eruditus—geographer, cartographer, research-
er of the Danube and the sea, astronomer, etc.—and thus a typical example 
of the seventeenth- to eighteenth-century intellectual, who, following the 
dissolution of the divine order, tried to recreate a broken world. Based on 
empirical philosophy, which places scientific methodology at the fore, 
Marsigli’s research relied on his own findings and experiences, using the 
highest technical standards of his time. This study, beyond his personal 
role, will focus primarily on those centres, processes and phenomena, pre-
sented with the integration of new perspectives and resources, which have 
thus far fallen outside the main line of research, or have only been investi-
gated recently. More specifically, it will look at his activity in collecting 
information, since Count Marsigli collected more than just objects, manu-
                                                            
1 The present study was prepared with the support of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences’ Bolyai János research scholarship and the OTKA PD tender, no. 105020. 
2 To this day, he is remembered mostly for his military achievements; a good ex-
ample of this is a recent volume of 16 studies published in Bologna, the greater 
part of which are devoted to military history: La scienza delle Armi. Luigi Ferdi-
nando Marsili 1658–1730, ed. by Museo di P. Poggi (Bologna 2012). 
3 The writer of the largest monograph on Marsigli deemed him unsuitable for dip-
lomatic work based on contemporary sources, who called him “vehement, impa-
tient and unsubtle,” i.e., “he was better as a soldier and commander”: J. Stoye, 
Marsigli’s Europe,1680–1730: The Life And Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, 
Soldier And Virtuoso (New Haven 1994), 29.  
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scripts, codices, maps, original documents and Roman Era remains. Mar-
sigli, as an “intelligence agent,” not only gathered information from all 
quarters but, through knowledge acquired from his travels and activity as a 
networker (intelligence capital), fared like a true entrepreneur on the con-
temporary European political scene. 
At an international conference in Bologna in 2009,4 it was declared—
some would say unpardonably destroying the legend—that the activities of 
the graphoman Italian count should be placed in a different light: several 
scholars suggested that the collector and disseminator of information was 
a spy,5 or, if one prefers, a passionate intelligence agent, information col-
lector, systematiser and transmitter. It is at any rate true that Count Luigi 
Ferdinando Marsigli had an extensive network of contacts not only in Ita-
ly, where he undertook intelligence services for the Venetian Republic and 
the Papal State (to this day not adequately uncovered), but also at the 
Viennese court, where he had been in the service of Leopold I (1640–
1705) from 1682, carrying out important diplomatic missions besides his 
military tasks. Later he was involved in the international scientific scene, 
an active member of the republic of letters and a remarkably international 
figure even by today’s standards. His contacts were widespread not only in 
the scientific world but also in the diplomatic, where, as we shall see, 
through his experiences of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy, he played an 
important role in the European transfer of culture.  
Our fundamental source for the study of Marsigli’s life and activities 
was his own detailed autobiography.6 Marsigli, who loudly advocated his 
principle of Nihil mihi, that is, “nothing for me,” crafted his message care-
fully, ensuring that posterity retained an image of his role in politics, the 
significance of his person and the justification of his actions. This became 
particularly important to him after 1703 when he was disgraced due to his 
surrender of Castle Breisach on the Rhine and was forced to leave the 
                                                            
4 La politica, la scienza, le armi. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della 
frontiera dell’Impero e dell’Europa, ed. by R. Gherardi (Bologna 2010). 
5 In fact, this opinion had appeared earlier, cf. S. Bene, “Acta Pacis—béke a 
muzulmánokkal. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili terve a karlócai béke iratainak ki-
adására,” Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 119, no. 2 (2006), 332, in Eng.: “Acta Pacis 
– Peace with the Muslims: Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli’s Plan for the Publication of 
the Documents of the Karlowitz Peace Treaty,” Camoenae Hungaricae 3 (2006), 
113–146. 
6 L. F. Marsigli, Autobiografia di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli messa in luce nel se-
condo centenario della morte di lui dal Comitato Marsiliano, ed. by E. Lovarini 
(Bologna 1930). 
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Habsburg’s service.7 Further important sources are his personal manu-
scripts, correspondence and documentation of his activities, which are re-
tained mainly in Bologna8 and partly in Vienna.  
We will now go through the locations and information centres that 
Count Marsigli visited and where he carried out his intelligence and net-
working activities, in order that we may, hopefully, get a closer look at the 
contemporary information network and methods of gathering, writing, 
transmitting and selling news, or at least, a particular segment of it.  
Italy 
Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli came from a large though not particular-
ly wealthy aristocratic family and, like many of his Italian contemporaries, 
he had several career opportunities before him: in the service of his city, 
the Papal State (since his birthplace, Bologna, belonged to it), or some 
other great Italian lord. Furthermore, he had the option of a career in the 
church, in science, as well as the one Marsigli settled on, the chosen pro-
fession of several of his contemporaries and compatriots, foreign service, 
chiefly Habsburg military service.9  
Marsigli came across the Ottoman question in his youthful travels 
across Italy—he claimed that the famed invincibility of the Ottomans had 
fascinated him since early childhood10—where he met all kinds of people 
who had some sort of connection to the Ottomans. On a journey from 
Rome to Naples, he met an English merchant who spent the greater por-
                                                            
7 A. Gardi, “Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli: come si organizza la propria memoria 
storica,” in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 237–264; for the events at Breisach see 
Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 216–252; M. Bussolari, Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e i 
documenti sulla questione di Brisacco (thesis, University of Bologna, 1985–1986). 
8 His manuscripts amount to 146 volumes (currently housed in the Bologna Uni-
versity Library Manuscript Collection as a separate series entitled “Fondo Marsili” 
[hereafter: BUB FM]. L. Frati, Catalogo dei manoscritti di Marsigli conservati 
nella Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna (Florence 1928). He preserved copies of 
his own manuscripts in bound volumes, along with documents and letters he re-
ceived or collected during his lifetime. 
9 E.g. Raimondo Montecuccoli, or the Bolognese Caprara family’s sons.  
10 “From a very young age, I have enjoyed reading widely on the history of the 
Turks, in which this nation was always portrayed as invincible. Thus was my de-
sire and will to get to know them born”; L. F. Marsigli, Stato militare dell’Impero 
Ottomano, incremento e decremento del medesimo (The Hague and Amsterdam 
1732), 3. For the Italian image of the Turks, cf. M. Soykut, Image of the “Turk” in 
Italy: A History of the “Other” in Early Modern Europe, 1453–1683 (Berlin 
2001). 
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tion of his time in Constantinople and Smyrna (now Izmir), and whom the 
young Italian count, out of sheer curiosity, questioned extensively about 
the Ottoman character. Then in Livorno he met the son of the then still liv-
ing Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680).11  
At this time, he formed his first scientific and political contacts, primar-
ily through his family connections. As his biographer, John Stoye, notes:  
 
Significant events in his life, even at that time [his youthful years in Italy], 
seem to have been meetings and conversations with men of letters who 
were scientists and he was able to profit from one of the greatest civilising 
merits of seventeenth-century Italy […] namely, the open character of in-
tellectual society.12 
 
In Rome he had connections to cardinals Flavio Chigi and de Luca and 
Queen Christina of Sweden, who lived there. He requested an audience 
with the newly-elected Pope Innocent XI (1676–1689), whom he met, 
with the help of senator Pietro Melara, in person for the first time around 
then.13 The pope was heavily invested in, and credited with helping, the 
struggle of the Habsburgs against the Ottomans, both politically and finan-
cially, and Marsigli reported to him the intelligence he had acquired on his 
trip to the Ottoman Empire. Marsigli travelled to Vienna in 1682, most 
likely due to the pope’s encouragement and even secret mandate to 
strengthen and aid the military party supporting the fight against the Otto-
mans.14 In 1688 Emperor Leopold sent Marsigli to Rome because he ur-
gently needed to convince Pope Innocent XI to continue disbursing church 
funds for the war against the Ottomans, in fact, if possible, to affect an in-
crease.15 Marsigli also had family connections in the Venetian Republic—
                                                            
11 Gy. Herczeg, “L’autobiografia di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli e l’Ungheria,” in 
Venezia, Italia, Ungheria fra Arcadia e Illuminismo, ed. by B. Köpeczi and P. 
Sárközy (Budapest 1982), 65–83, at 66. 
12 Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 8. 
13 “Nel ’77 con licenza di mio padre mi resi a Roma […] ebbi l’onore di baciare il 
piede della santità d’Innocenzo XI, condottovi dell’Ambaciador della mia patria, il 
senator Pietro Melara,” Herczeg, “L’autobiografia,” 4; M. G. Lippi, Vita di Papa 
Innocenzo XI (Rome 1889).  
14 For the Habsburg-friendly political line of the papal court, cf. G. Signorotto, “Lo 
Sqadrone volante. I cardinali ‘liberi’ e la politica europea nella seconda metà del 
XVII secolo,” in La Corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento “teatro” della politica 
europea, ed. by G. Signorotto and M. A. Visceglia (Rome 1998), 93–137.  
15 Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 54, 56, 66, 100. They reached an agreement, but at a 
price: promising a piece of the territories recaptured from the Ottomans to the 
pope’s nephew, Livio Odescalchi. The transaction was arranged by Marsigli, who 
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which was a hub of legal and illegal intelligence16—and which, as we will 
see, he utilised in his direct contact with the Ottomans.  
Vienna 
As is well known, during the reign of Emperor Leopold I (1640–1705), 
Leopold and his cousin Louis XIV, the great European rivals of the age, 
competed against each other relentlessly.17 At the same time, the struggle 
of the Christian world against the ever-invading Ottomans continued. The 
successful conclusion of the war on two fronts, against both the French 
and the Ottomans, and the resulting consolidation of Danubian–Balkan 
lands recaptured from the Ottomans, turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a 
real powerhouse.18 People of Italian descent occupied significant positions 
in contemporary Europe, particularly in the Habsburg Empire, thanks to 
their competence and openness, and since many of them did not find suit-
able positions at home. At the court of Leopold I, Italian was all but the of-
ficial language, since so many of his advisors were Italian. Leopold not 
only spoke perfect Italian, but also repeatedly expressed his pleasure at 
having the opportunity use it, since it always reminded him that he was 
head of the (Holy) Roman Empire.19 Thus many people of Italian descent 
lived at the emperor’s court; priests, monks, people of the church, histori-
ans and musicians.20 Italian military engineers had been arriving continu-
ously since the sixteenth century for the modernisation of the Hungarian 
border fortress system, whilst both volunteers and imperial mercenaries, 
                                                                                                                           
sent reports to Rome from Srem, which were received by the banker Odescalchi, 
alongside the title “Prince of the Holy Roman Empire.” Cf. Manuscritti diversi 
toccanti la seconda spedizione a Roma e maneggio per D. Livio Odescalchi con 
scritture naturali e militari, vol. 4 (BUB FM Ms. 54).  
16 P. Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e controspionaggio ai tempi 
della Serenissima (Milan [1994] 2004). 
17 J. Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals, 
1550–1780 (Cambridge 2003); J. Bérenger, “An Attempted Rapprochement be-
tween France and the Emperor,” in Louis XIV and Europe, ed. by R. Hatton (Lon-
don 1976), 133–152; R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
1550–1700: An Interpretation (Oxford 1979). 
18 J. Bérenger, Léopold Ier (1640–1705), fondateur de la puissance austrichienne 
(Paris 2004).  
19 U. de Bin, Leopoldo I. Imperatore e la sua Corte nella letteratura italiana (Tri-
este 1910). 
20 A. Wandruschka, Österreich und Italien im XVIII-ten Jahrhundert (Vienna 
1963); J. M. Thiriet, “Les Italiens à Vienne sous le règne de Léopold I (1655–
1705),” in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 39–44. 
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amongst them high-ranking officers, came to fight against the Ottomans.21 
By the second half of the seventeenth century, a military party, the so-
called Militärpartei, consisting largely of military leaders of Italian de-
scent, had formed at the Viennese court. Following the insights and politi-
cal and military views of Raimondo Montecuccoli (Modena, 1609–Linz, 
1680),22 they supported Emperor Leopold I in his military campaign on 
two fronts, and in building absolutism and European competitiveness. 
Montecuccoli’s ideas prevailed in Marsigli’s system of thought, alongside 
those of the infamous Antonio Caraffa (Naples, 1646–Vienna, 1693), 
known for his cruelty against the Hungarians and the Transylvanians.23 
Marsigli was seen as the implementer of Caraffa’s plans and ideas.24 
Since the talent of many arrivals from Italy manifested itself in both 
military and individual-cultural spheres, they were often given special as-
signments or roles at the Viennese court. Amongst them was Count Mar-
sigli, who arrived in Vienna on the eve of the Ottoman siege in 1682, pre-
sumably with some serious letters of recommendation, since Emperor Le-
opold I soon received him in person. Like many of his Italian compatriots, 
he began his service in the imperial army as a volunteer, where he pro-
gressed nicely through the ranks to general by 1699. He worked in Hunga-
ry right up until 1701, fighting the Ottomans and later taking part in peace 
talks with them, discussing the demarcation of the border between the two 
                                                            
21 It is worth mentioning Piccolomini and the Bolognese Caprara brothers, of 
whom the youngest, Aeneas (1631–1701), achieved many military successes on 
the battlefield in Hungary. F. Martelli, “Generali italiani a Vienna tra scienza 
nuova, empirismo e ideali assolutistici,” in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 45–100. 
22 Montecuccoli was the author of numerous significant works on strategy and mil-
itary science. For the most recent literature on him cf. Raimondo Montecuccoli: te-
oria, pratica militare, politica e cultura nell’Europa des Seicento, ed. by A. Pini, 
(Pavullo nel Frignano 2009); R. Gherardi and F. Martelli, La pace degli eserciti e 
dell’economia: Montecuccoli e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna (Bologna 2009); 
“Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609–1680): Lettere, arte militare e scienze agli albori 
dell’Europa moderna,” Annuario (Accademia d’Ungheria in Roma, Istituto storico 
“Fraknói”) (2007–2008, 2008–2009), ed. by É. Vígh, 411–457. 
23 P. Kónya, Az eperjesi vértörvényszék, 1687 [The Prešov Blood Tribunal, 1687] 
(Eperjes and Budapest 1994). 
24 L. Nagy, “Rebellis barbárok és nagylelkű hősök. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili 
nézetei a Habsburg és az Oszmán Birodalomról” [Rebellious barbarians and gen-
erous heroes. Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli’s views on the Habsburg and Ottoman 
empires], Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 119, 2 (2006), 319; id., Határok, vándorok, 
kémek. A magyarokról és a románokról alkotott kép Luigi Ferdinando Marsili 
írásaiban [Borders, wanderers, spies. The image of Hungarians and Romanians in 
Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli’s writings] (Budapest 2011), 213. 
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empires. Marsigli’s relationship to the Viennese court and the Ottoman 
war was fundamentally defined by his inner desire to fight the Ottomans, 
the ethos of the Italian community in Vienna and the pope’s encourage-
ment to free these Christian lands. Although, being an imperial soldier, he 
did not and could not belong to the official Habsburg information net-
work,25 the Viennese court was able to take full advantage of the count’s 
lust for adventure, intermingled with his willingness to collect and dissem-
inate information through both official and secret diplomatic missions as-
signed to him.  
Relations with Constantinople and Ottoman Empire 
Marsigli, with the help of his above-mentioned Venetian contacts, first 
travelled to the capital of the Ottoman Empire in 1679–1680, which was 
itself a significant centre of information and intelligence,26 mainly through 
the permanent embassies of the European courts. These embassies collect-
ed news from the Ottoman Empire and the Levant and forwarded it to the 
European courts, as well as being arrival points for the freshest news from 
the Christian centres, to facilitate the ambassadors’ politicising at the 
Porte. The Ottomans’ diplomatic and trade relations with European coun-
tries were mostly facilitated by European merchants and diplomats, thus 
the Ottoman government was forced to enlist the help of Christian mer-
chants (e.g. Ragusans), renegades, immigrant Moriscos and Jews.27  
Marsigli, as mentioned previously, arrived in Constantinople in 1679 in 
the company of the Venetian ambassador Pietro Civrani, in a non-official 
capacity, and since he was not a subject of Venice, he was much freer to 
                                                            
25 I. Hiller, “Titkos Levelezők Intézménye” [Institute of Secret Correspondents], in 
R. Várkonyi Ágnes emlékkönyv születésének 70. évfordulója ünnepére, ed. by P. 
Tusor et al. (Budapest 1998), 204–216; id., “A Habsburg informátorhálózat 
kiépítése és működése az Oszmán Birodalomban” [Construction and operation of a 
Habsburg information network in the Ottoman Empire], in Információáramlás a 
magyar és török végvári rendszerben, ed. by T. Petercsák and M. Berecz (Eger 
1999), 157–169; D. Kerekes, “Kémek Konstantinápolyban. A Habsburg infor-
mációszerzés szervezete és működése a magyarországi visszafoglaló háborúk 
idején (1683–1699)” [Spies in Constantinople. The organisation and operation of 
the Habsburg acquisition of information at the time of the wars of reoccupation in 
Hungary, 1683–1699], Századok 141 (2007), 1217–1257. 
26 G. Ágoston, “Birodalom és információ: Konstantinápoly, mint a koraújkori 
Európa információs központja” [Empire and information: Constantinople, the hub 
of information in the early modern period], in Az értelem bátorsága. Tanulmányok 
Perjés Géza emlékére, ed. by G. Hausner (Budapest 2005), 31–60. 
27 Ibid., 35–36. 
An Italian Information Agent in the Hungarian Theatre of War  
 
 
92
move around during his 11-month stay there. Civrani openly encouraged 
and supported him (materially too) in his information gathering activities, 
until he had the opportunity to know the ambassadors of other European 
countries as well. Not long after his arrival, he got in touch with John 
Finch, English ambassador to Constantinople, who had previously lived in 
Italy for an extensive period. Finch helped Marsigli in his scientific, net-
working and intelligence activities and even provided him with some pro-
tection.28 Besides Finch, Marsigli also nurtured relationships with the fol-
lowing ambassadors: the Frenchman Gabriel Joseph de Lavergne, the Aus-
trian Johann Christoph von Kunitz and the Pole Samuel Proski. He 
became acquainted with the Orthodox patriarch Iakovos, as well as the 
Greek court interpreter Alexander Maurocordato,29 with whom he would 
meet again several times during the Habsburg–Ottoman negotiations. 
Since Marsigli was still very young at this time, the Ottomans perhaps did 
not even suspect him, despite it being an open secret that the ambassadors 
brought spies into the empire with them. He himself wrote of his first trip 
to the Ottoman Empire:  
 
Sparing neither effort nor expense, I have gathered intelligence that 
seemed essential to my cause. I did this despite being warned that I could 
be in danger, since the Turkish government does not look kindly on a 
Christian taking pains to get to know them, and above all their military sit-
uation. Nevertheless the Turks co-operated with me in both teaching me 
and giving me access to information.30  
 
Civrani provided him with an Italian interpreter, but he later found him-
self a reliable interpreter, Abraham Gabai, a Jew, from whom he learned a 
little of the Ottoman-Turkish language31 and with whom he kept in touch 
for twenty years.32 Through his Jewish contacts he also managed to whee-
                                                            
28 S. Magnani, “Il giovane Marsili tra scienza e politica: le lettere inedite da Cos-
tantinopoli,” in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 224–225. 
29 N. Camariano, Alexandre Maurocordato, le Gran Dragoman. Son activité 
diplomatique 1673–1709 (Thessaloniki 1970); A. Sturdza, L’Europe Orientale et 
le Role Historique des Maurocordato, 1660–1830 (Paris 1913). 
30 Marsigli, Stato militare, Prologo, I.  
31 He never mastered the language; he could not read Turkish and in all contact 
with them—with the exception of a few basic communicational situations—he al-
ways relied on an interpreter.  
32 “stipendiando al mio servizio un Ebreo di nome Abram Gabai che trovai di tutta 
fede, ed abilità per servirmi d’interprete”; L. F. Marsigli, “Lettera-prefazione al 
catalogo dei manoscritti oriental,” in Scritti inediti di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli 
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dle his way into Ottoman intellectual spheres that maintained relations 
both with those Ottomans who were close to the sultan and Westerners. In 
most cases Marsigli preferred to protect the identity of his sources, and no 
doubt he had every reason to do so, but in his autobiography he mentions 
by name Aga Hüseyn, a tax collector in the capital, as well as two courti-
ers. Of the latter, one was the Venetian renegade Abdullah, who was en-
trusted with cutting Sultan Mehmed IV’s nails and guarding his turbans, 
and who took Marsigli into the sultan’s palace and the seraglio, naturally 
with the exception of the harem. However, Marsigli did not only appear in 
the higher echelons, he made acquaintances and talked with representa-
tives from all layers of society in the cosmopolitan city. He met Italian 
prisoners, talked with fishermen on the Bosporus and Ottoman doctors, he 
obtained information from a boatman in the service of the sultan on the 
latest foreign policy of the Porte, from whom he learned that they were to 
head west. Marsigli duly informed the Habsburg ambassador, who ignored 
his information, upon which the young Italian count noted in disappoint-
ment and outrage that the monarch whose ambassadors are so unreliable is 
certainly an unfortunate one.33 Of his scientist friends, he repeatedly men-
tioned the geographer Ebu Bekir,34 as well as the old “Usseim Effendi,” 
whose nickname he also revealed: “Millevirtù” (that is, polymath, homo 
universalis). Otherwise known as Hüseyn Hezarfen, he was a great help to 
Marsigli in publicising the latest political and military situation of the Ot-
toman Empire, as well as briefing Marsigli on cultural issues and discuss-
ing science and literature with him.35 Hezarfen was amongst the first of the 
                                                                                                                           
raccolti e pubblicati nel II centenario della morte a cura del Comitato Marsiliano 
(Bologna 1930), 176. 
33 Marsigli, Autobiografia, 19–24 (“compatii la disgrazia del principe, di avere un 
ministro che riposava su principii e notizie così false”). 
34 Ebu Bekir bin Behrám’s most significant work (ed. by Dimaski) was the transla-
tion of Wilhelm and Joan Blaeu’s (father and son) work entitled Atlas Maior sive 
cosmographia Blaviana qua solum salum Coelum accuratissime describuntur. The 
Dutch ambassador Justinus Colyer made a gift of this grandiose map-of-the-world 
series to Mehmed IV in 1668 during his sojourn in Edirne. The Ottoman geogra-
pher worked on the six-volume edition (also published as a nine-volume edition) 
for ten years. Finally, besides translating, he delivered it to the sultan himself with 
significant additions to the Islamic countries, primarily the areas occupied by the 
Ottomans, under the title Nusretü’l-Islam ve’s sürur fi tahriri Atlas Mayor. Marsig-
li was able to obtain this expensive map series during his second stint in Constan-
tinople (in 1691) at a great price from a renegade of Livorno, Mustafa, who was 
head of the Imperial Mint. 
35 Hezarfen Hüseyn Efendi (1600–1678/79?). For more on his life, cf. H. H. 
Efendi, Telhis ül-beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman [Summary of declarations in the 
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Ottoman intellectuals in the Ottoman capital to have a wide range of 
Western cultural contacts; for instance, he knew the famous French orien-
talist Antoine Galland, who stayed with the French ambassador in Con-
stantinople between 1670 and 1675.36  
During the 1683 siege of Vienna, then as an imperial soldier fighting 
against the Ottomans, Marsigli fell prisoner to the Tatars, of which he 
gave a detailed account of in his memoirs.37 He presented himself as a Ve-
netian merchant—this not being the first time he had been forced to take 
on a false identity—thus saving his life. He changed hands several times in 
the Ottoman camp, until finally, after the siege, they deported him to Bos-
nia. From there, through his Venetian contacts, and following payment of 
a ransom, he was freed after a relatively short time (nine months). This 
perilous experience left an indelible mark on him for the rest of his life: 
when he was in the Balkans he visited his former captors, and as soon as 
he had the chance, he helped free Christian prisoners from Ottoman cap-
tivity, even establishing a collection point for prisoners’ ransoms in his 
hometown. 
The war went on and the secret peace talks, which were entered into 
with the Ottoman representatives Zülfikar Effendi and Alexander 
Maurocordato in Vienna in 1689, ran aground.38 However, in 1691, with 
English mediation, the possibility of reaching a Habsburg–Ottoman peace 
agreement arose once again. Marsigli was sent to Constantinople with the 
English ambassador Sir William Hussey as his secretary,39 to carry out a 
                                                                                                                           
laws of the House of Osman], ed. by Sevim Ilgürel (Ankara 1998), 4–8; H. Wurm, 
Der Osmanische historiker Huseyn b. Cafer, genaut Hezarfen, und die Istanbuler 
Gesellschaft in der zweiten Halfte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg 1971); M. F. 
Molnár, “Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli on the condition of the Turkish army in the 
17th century,” in Orientalista Nap 2000, ed. by Á. Birtalan and M. Yamaji (Buda-
pest 2001), 27–35. Hezarfen Efendi’s work, entitled Telhis ül-beyan fi Kavanin-i 
Al-i Osman—which Marsigli also used in his major written work on the Otto-
mans—is one of the most important Ottoman works on the organisational structure 
of the Empire. 
36 Ch. Schefer, Journal d’Antoine Galland pendant son séjour à l’Ambassade de 
France à Costantinople (1672–1673), vol. 2 (Paris 1881); B. Lewis, I Musulmani 
alla scoperta dell’Europa (Milano 1992), 159–160. 
37 L. F. Marsili, Ragguaglio della schiavitù, ed. by B. Basile (Rome 1996). 
38 Zülfikâr Paşa’nın Viyana sefâreti ve esâreti (1099/1103–1688/1692). Cerîde-i 
takrîrât-i Zülfikâr efendi der kal’a-i Beç [The legation and captivity of Zülfikar Pa-
sha in Vienna, 1688–1692. Memoirs of Zülfikar efendi in the fortress of Vienna], 
ed. by M. Güler (Istanbul 2008). 
39 “sotto il finto carattere di segretario del re d’Inghliterra appresso il di lui ambas-
ciatore,” Marsigli, Autobiografia, 131.  
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delicate and dangerous diplomatic mission, which is seldom researched 
and discussed to this day. His mission to Constantinople had a two-fold 
purpose: firstly to keep an eye on the English ambassador, since the 
Viennese court did not trust him; and secondly he had to try to gauge 
whether the Ottomans really wanted peace and submit an updated report 
on the situation in the Ottoman Empire. This report, addressed to the em-
peror, which Marsigli handed him in person, was ready by June–July 
1691.40 Besides this, Count Marsigli and his companion, Christoph Ignati-
us Quarient von Rall (the last imperial ambassador to Constantinople and 
Kunitz’s nephew), probably had a mandate to watch their interpreters, 
Giorgio Cleronome and Janaki Porphyrita, very closely as well. The two 
interpreters were sent back to the Ottoman capital to provide continuous 
intelligence, since the last permanent ambassador to Constantinople had 
left in 1683, and with him all those important people who had played a 
significant role in imperial espionage.41 Janaki, being unpaid, provided in-
telligence for the Porte and the French as well, thus the imperial envoys 
arriving in Constantinople reported him to be less than reliable, as well as 
greatly hindering the success of Marsigli’s peace mission. Simultaneously, 
Janaki tried to besmirch Marsigli at the Viennese court, claiming that he 
was a renegade, even having been circumcised.42 During this mission, in-
teresting news was circulated about Marsigli. For instance, Thomas Coke43 
reported a piece of unsubstantiated gossip from Constantinople—“Upon 
the arrival of Mr Guariente, it became clear that the rumour claiming that 
he and Count Marsigli had been imprisoned in a dark tower, was un-
true”—and could not cease to be amazed at how such rumours could 
spread, without the faintest relation to reality.44 Of course, the rumours 
may have had some basis: we know, for instance, that the French ambas-
                                                            
40 Relazione del Marsigli a S. M. Cesarea dello stato della Corte Ottomana, della 
sua milizia, de’trattati fattisi sino a quel tempo intorno alla pace del 1691 (BUB 
FM Ms. 55, cc. 228–247). The fundamental data and conclusions of his later, ma-
jor work on the Ottomans can be found here. 
41 Kerekes, “Kémek Konstantinápolyban,” 1227–1228. 
42 L. Nagy, “La frontiera, il buon governo a l’armonia mondiale. L. F. Marsigli sul-
la frontiera della Transilvania,” in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 189–190. 
43 Coke was the “chargé d’affaires” of the English Eastern Company. A. C. Wood, 
A History of the Levant Company (Abingdon [1935, 1964] 2013), 252. 
44 Coke from Constantinople, 7 June 1692. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, 
Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereafter: ÖStA HHStA] Staatenabteilungen Türkei I. Kar-
ton 163, Konv. 1, f. 76r (“sarà già chiarito coll’arrivo del sig.re Guariente della fal-
sità di quel rumore che lui et conte Marsigli fossero incarcerarti in una torre 
profonda, mi maraviglio come si può inventare sia spaccate bugie, senza il minimo 
fondam[en]to”). 
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sador to Constantinople, Châteauneuf, must have suspected Marsigli’s true 
identity and spying activities, since he did everything he could to capture 
Marsigli and have him killed.45 Marsigli spent the next few months com-
muting between Vienna, Adrianople and the Ottoman capital, later using 
the longer but safer Wallachian–Transylvanian route. He wrote reports, 
confidential records and letters to the Viennese court—besides the emper-
or, also addressing the Chairman of the Military Council, or Chancellor 
Ulrich Kinsky—in which he gave accounts of the situation in Transylva-
nia, Wallachia and Moldavia, of the Transylvanian prince Emmerich 
Thököly and of the size and condition of the Ottoman army. Meanwhile, 
Hussey and the grand vizier died, along with Sultan Süleyman. Marsigli, 
however, stayed on and “stepped into the shoes of a former English am-
bassador’s secretary.”46 This was a dangerous game: Marsigli could not 
reveal his true role, and everyone at the Viennese court tried to keep it a 
secret since it could have been extremely embarrassing and cause numer-
ous problems, not only for those associated with the emperor but for their 
allies as well.47 Most of his letters were forwarded to Vienna via the Eng-
lish ambassador William Paget, the Dutch ambassador Conrad 
Heemskerck, or through Wallachia, sent to the camp of Imperial General 
Federico Veterani (1650–1695). Besides establishing relationships with 
the highest-ranking Ottoman officials and conducting negotiations with 
them—including the grand vizier—whether as part of his disguise, or out 
of a genuine interest, Marsigli continued his scientific work and observa-
tions in the Ottoman capital. One tangible result was that “Marsigli was 
duly elected a fellow of the Royal Society on 25 November 1691.”48 He 
had to be very careful with both the Dutch and English ambassadors in or-
der to continue receiving as much information as possible from them on 
the current state of affairs and the peace plans:  
 
At every meeting with both the Dutch and the English, I was at great pains 
to show them every appropriate courtesy and conceal my hostility, for in-
stance, when they refused to inform me of any letters being sent, whilst I 
                                                            
45 Marsigli, Autobiografia, 161. 
46 Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 115. 
47 “Ho smenticato dir’ancora, doversi (96v) guardar’ Marsigli a non apparir’ alla 
Porte Ottomana in figura di cesareo ministro, perche quando ciò venisse scoperto 
da’ Turchi, non solo essi triomfarebbero della sua qualificata presenza, il che si 
pretende di scanzar’ in ogni modo dalla parte nostra, ma di più questo potrebbe 
recare a gli alleati nostri molti et inconvenienti sospetti.” (ÖStA HHStA 
Staatenabteilungen Türkei I. Karton 161, Konv. 4). Thanks to Dóra Kerekes for the 
extract.  
48 Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 111. 
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was obliged to report to them on everything that happened. My corre-
spondents never came to me because, knowing who I was, they would have 
removed them.49  
 
In April 1692, after roughly a 12-month stint, when he was no longer 
faring well with the French ambassador and the transmission of his let-
ters,50 and both the English and Dutch ambassadors51 felt his presence to 
be a burden, he returned to Vienna. 
The original aim of his major work on the Ottomans, Stato militare 
dell’Impero Ottomano, incremento e decremento del medesimo (The rise 
and fall of the military situation of the Ottoman Empire), was as a practi-
cal aid to Leopold I’s battle against them. However, as it was published 
only two years after the author’s death in 1732, but appeared in St Peters-
burg in 1737 in a Russian translation, it became an aid to the Russians in 
their fight against the Ottomans. The work, besides being a rich repository 
of information gathered on the Ottomans, provides the most detailed mili-
tary description of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, wherever possible taking examples from the war of reoccupation of 
Hungary. The book is a particularly valuable piece in its own genre due to 
                                                            
49 “In ogn’Incontro tanto con Olandesi, che Inghlesi ho cercato ogni contrassegno 
di vero rispetto verso loro evidente anche diró al mio privato essere. Ho dissimulati 
tutti li torti mi facevano e massime nelli speditioni delle lettere senza avisarmi, e 
prohibire á me di mai farne senza loro saputa, e che obbedivo, perchè le cause 
urgenti al’servitio dell’Augustissimo Padrone mancavano. Li miei corrispondenti 
mai venivano nella mia casa, perche conosciutimi sarebbero stati levati.” ÖStA 
HHStA Staatskanzlei Türkei, Karton 160, f. 22. 
50 Marsigli to the Emperor from Constantinople, 14 Apr. 1692: “il francese sempre 
con l’arco teso contro mi levatomi il comercio di lettere per opra dei stipendiati di 
Cesare, come sentirà dal Quarienti, da tanti solecitata la mia partenza di qui per 
tante maniere si volse spaventarmi, perchè non ritornassi più qui, li Venetiani qui 
sono di me gelosi, Ragusa scala per le lettere del’Francese et Venetiani, 
Transylvani per chi vole et per me mai lettere, non posso permettere alli miei 
corrispondenti di mai venire in mia casa, perche subbito sarebbero levati” (ÖStA 
HHStA Staatenabteilungen Türkei I. Karton 163, Konv. 3, f. 36r).  
51 For the operations of Dutch and English ambassadors in the East, cf. C. Hey-
wood, “An Undiplomatic Anglo-Dutch Dispute at the Porte: The Quarrel at Edirne 
between Coenraad Van Heemskerck and Lord Paget (1693),” in Friends and Ri-
vals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seven-
teenth to the Early Nineteenth Century, ed. by A. Hamilton et al. (Leiden 2000), 
59–94. In the first half of the 17th century, Habsburg and Dutch ambassadors were 
at a disadvantage compared with their Venetian, French and English counterparts, 
who had a lot of political experience, an extensive network of contacts and a well-
functioning intelligence network. Cf. Kerekes, Kémek Kontantinápolyban. 
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the 48 illustrations, complete with annotations, two maps and numerous 
summaries and economic tables that can be found within it.52  
Moldavia, Wallachia 
While commuting between Constantinople and Vienna, Marsigli travelled 
through Wallachia several times. The princely court in Bucharest, with its 
secretaries—a whole chain of which took part in the transmission of dip-
lomatic correspondence—was also a hub of information exchange at the 
time, since letters reached Vienna more quickly and securely from here 
than via the Constantinople—Ragusa—Fiume—Venice route. Under 
Prince Constantin Brancoveanu (1688–1714), Constantin Cantacuzino, the 
exceptionally talented statesman and historian, ran the intelligence gather-
ing, distributing and forwarding operation. Information and correspon-
dence were disseminated not only to Vienna, but also to Constantinople, 
whilst maintaining good relations with Transylvania. The Greek Cantacuz-
ino family in Constantinople had serious connections not only in the Medi-
terranean area but also in Transylvania. Furthermore, they were related to 
three of the most important interpreters and spies from Vienna in the Ot-
toman Empire, amongst them the leader of the entire Viennese spy ring, 
the previously-mentioned Marc’Antonio Mamucca della Torre.53 Marsigli, 
as “secretary to the English ambassador,” and as an imperial officer, had a 
good relationship with Brancoveanu, the latter claiming that he would like 
to be a subject of the emperor.54 Besides this, he gathered every possible 
piece of intelligence from the court of the Wallachian voivode and carried 
out the military engineering tasks entrusted to him.  
Hungary, Transylvania 
Since the fighting continued following the liberation of Buda from the Ot-
tomans in 1686,55 the interests of the Habsburg Empire and Hungary com-
                                                            
52 Following the 1737 Russian publication, a further three editions appeared: in 
Turkish (Ankara 1934), a facsimile edition with an introduction and an index (Graz 
1972), as well as a Hungarian translation by the author, with her foreword, notes 
and index (Budapest 2007). 
53 Nagy, Határok, vándorok, kémek, 33–35.  
54 Relazione a Sacra Maestà Cesarea di tutto il successo al Marsili nel primo vi-
aggio che fece a Constantinopoli, per i negoziati della pace del 1691 (BUB FM 
Ms. 55, f. 139–146).  
55 For more on the battles following the Ottoman attack on Vienna (1683), cf. E. 
Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–1700 
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pelled them to settle the administrative status of the liberated territories 
and build a hinterland economy that functioned appropriately for warfare 
as well as a strong border protection system. The men of Viennese gov-
ernment who directed the policies of the Habsburg Empire were convinced 
that the modernisation of the newly reoccupied central European region 
(the so-called neoaquistica) and its incorporation into the framework of 
the empire would only be possible based on the mechanical worldview of 
the age. In this light, elite members, active politicians, Austrians and Hun-
garians alike, armed with the works of Machiavelli, Grotius, Bodin, Puf-
endorf and the chamber works, set about organising, building and modern-
ising Hungary. Fervent work began and the relevant imperial committees 
received about 50 different draft proposals.56 The most frequently-
mentioned and best-known three drafts were: (1) Leopold Kollonich’s 
500-page proposal entitled Einrichtung des Königreichs Ungarn,57 pre-
pared upon imperial command; (2) Palatine Pál Esterházy’s proposal, 
submitted and modified several times, which, besides representing the 
principles of the absolutist state system, primarily promoted the interests 
of the Hungarian aristocracy;58 and finally (3) the memoirs of the Nice-
born Minorite Angelo Gabrielle de Stizza on the governance of Hungary, 
                                                                                                                           
(Stuttgart 1988), chapter 11; F. Szakály, Hungaria eliberata. Budavár visszavétele 
és Magyarország felszabadítása a török uralom alól. 1683–1718 [Hungaria eliber-
ata. The recapture of the Buda castle and the liberation of Hungary from Turkish 
rule, 1683–1718] (Budapest 1986); I. Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans between 
Vienna and Belgrade 1683–1739 (New York 1995). 
56 Á. R. Várkonyi, Europica varietas—Hungarica varietas (Budapest 1994),193–
194. 
57 The goal of the Einrichtungswerk was to centralise and catholicise Hungary; 
they recommended creating manufactories and introducing a new tax system. Cf. 
Einrichtungswerk des Königreichs Hungarn (1688–1890), ed. by J. Kalmár and J. 
J. Varga (Stuttgart 2010); J. J. Varga, “Berendezkedési tervek Magyarországon a 
török kiűzésének időszakában. Az Einrichtungswerk” [Installation plans in Hunga-
ry during the period of the expulsion of the Turks. The Einrichtungswerk], Száza-
dok Füzetek 1 (1993), 30–40.  
58 Besides the principles of the absolutist state structure, it is primarily the interests 
of the Hungarian aristocracy that are represented here. Much like the proposals of 
the Viennese committee, the Hungarians addressed economic issues in the greatest 
detail. Every committee was aware that continued fighting would only be sustain-
able with increased income to the empire. Thus the security and effectiveness of 
production had to be increased, which could only be achieved through firm, central 
decisions from administrative bodies that would then enforce them. E. Iványi, “Es-
terházy Pál nádor és a magyar rendek tervezete az ország új berendezkedésével 
kapcsolatban” [The proposal of Palatine Pál Esterházy and the Hungarian nobility 
for the new structure of the country], Levéltári Közlemények 42 (1971), 137–162. 
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in which the Italian fire master, who had helped out during the siege of 
Buda, recorded, under the title Il governo dell’Ongaria. L’anno 1701, how 
Hungary could be governed in accordance with Habsburg interests.59 An-
other work of a different genre and nature can be classified alongside these 
ambitious proposals: Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli’s reports to the emperor 
following the 1699 Karlowitz peace treaty,60 that is, the reports of the su-
pervisor of the demarcation of the border between the Ottoman and Habs-
burg empires.61 In these reports the Italian imperial officer, besides de-
scribing practical implementations for the new frontier and negotiations 
with the Ottomans—based on tradition, but in the spirit of modernisa-
tion—makes several recommendations to the emperor regarding the ar-
rangements of the recaptured territories.62 
                                                            
59 Angelo Gabriele recommended the centralisation of the administration of the 
country: the creation of a Court Council and Hungarian Council, the restriction of 
the authority of the palatine, as well as political, economic and military reforms 
(frequently transferred commanders, removing the right to aristocratic insurrec-
tion) and the complete reorganisation of the judicial system. He wanted to create a 
powerful army, consisting of foreigners, to deal with uprisings. Cf. “Tüzes Gábor 
emlékirata Magyarország kormányzásáról” [The memoirs of Gábor Tüzes on the 
governance of Hungary], Történelmi Tár, ser. 2, 1 (1900), 219–263; A. Szántay, 
“Könyvtárosok és történetírók. Angelo Gabriele kormányzati tervezetétől II. József 
reformjaiig” [Librarians and historians. From Angelo Gabriele’s draft proposal to 
Joseph II’s reforms], Történelmi Szemle 38, 1 (1996), 45–61. 
60 It was signed by Emperor Leopold I, King of Hungary, and the Ottoman Sultan 
Mustafa II on 26 Jan. 1699, to last for the ensuing 25 years. See M. F. Molnár, 
“Der Friede von Karlowitz und das Osmanische Reich,” in Frieden und 
Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen. Das Osmanische Reich und die 
Habsburgmonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and N. 
Spannenberger (Stuttgart 2013), 197–220. 
61 Relazioni dei confini della Croazia, e della Transilvania a Sua Maestà Cesarea 
(1699–1701) (BUB FM Ms. 59–60). Published: L. F. Marsili, Relazioni dei confini 
della Croazia e della Transilvania a sua Maestá Cesarea (1699–1701), vols. 1–2, 
ed. by R. Gherardi (Modena 1986); For responses to these from the emperor and 
the Hofkriegsrat in Vienna: Plenipotenza ed istruzione Cesarea per la 
commissione dei confini con i rescritti pure Cesarei riportati nel stabilimento de’ 
medesimi; Lettere del Consiglio di guerra ricevute nella divisone de’Confini della 
Schiavonia e Croazia (BUB FM Ms. 62). 
62 M. F. Molnár, “Modernizációs tervezetek Magyarországon a XVII–XVIII. 
század fordulóján. Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli gróf reformjavaslatai” [Moderni-
sation proposals in Hungary at the turn of the 18th century. Reform proposals of 
Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli], in Tradíció és modernizáció a XVIII–XX. 
században, ed. by E. Bodnár and G. Demeter (Budapest 2008), 93–102.  
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Following Karlowitz, fundamental changes to the relationship between 
the Habsburg and Ottoman empires took place: the previously moving and 
uncertain borders were replaced by a permanent boundary between the two 
states.63 At the instigation of the Bohemian Court Chancellor, Count Franz 
Ulrich Kinsky, who was one of the main directors of Viennese politics 
from 1695, Leopold I appointed Marsigli, “plenam […] potestatem ac au-
thoritatem,” imperial envoy, despite attacks on him in the Viennese court. 
Marsigli was charged with demarcating the borderlines, which were only 
schematically defined in the treaty of Karlowitz.64 The fact that he was se-
lected was no coincidence, since the Italian count had carried out the mili-
tary reinforcement of the border region in 1689–1690, as well as mapping 
the area (of which there are numerous reports and a proposal to resolve 
border disputes). Following this, in 1697 the elector of Saxony authorised 
him to assess the border regions, which he did with such a high level of 
technical knowledge and professional and military engineering expertise 
(building as well as demolishing bridges, developing new transportation 
routes, reinforcing castles, etc.), also carrying out geographical surveying 
and collection, that he became a real expert on border assessment. During 
the Karlowitz peace talks, he appeared as an advisor to the imperial com-
mittee (consigliere assistente), that is, as practically the only expert on the 
border region with local knowledge.65 Having won the demarcation man-
                                                            
63 For valuable literature on border demarcation, cf. R. Gherardi, “Scienza e gov-
erno della frontiera: il problema dei confini balcanici e danubiani nella pace di 
Carlowitz,” Il pensiero politico 32, 3 (1999), 323–351; M. F. Molnár, “Karlofça 
antlaşmasından sonra Osmanlı-Habsburg sınırı (1699–1701)” [Ottoman-Habsburg 
frontier after the treaty of Carlowitz], in Osmanlı I. Siyaset, ed. by G. Eren (Ankara 
1999), 472–479; eadem, “Il Triplice Confine. Delimitazione del confine veneto–
turco–asburgico dopo il trattato di Carlowitz (1699),” in I Turchi, gli Asburgo e 
l’Adriatico, ed. by G. Németh and A. Papo (Trieste 2007), 163–171; eadem, “L. F. 
Marsili e gli ottomani. La frontiera asburgico-ottomana dopo la pace di Carlowitz,” 
in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 147–172; S. Bene, “Questions of the New Bal-
can Settlement after 1699: L. F. Marsili and Local Traditions,” in ibid., 199–216; 
Nagy, La frontiera, il buon governo, 173–198. 
64 For detailed descriptions of his difficulties at the peace conference and the 
Viennese court, cf. Marsigli, Autobiografia, 199–208; and R. Gherardi, Potere e 
costituzione a Vienna fra Sei e Settecento (Bologna 1980), 49–57. For the Latin 
text of Marsigli’s appointment, cf. BUB FM Ms. 62. 
65 M. F. Molnár, “Tárgyalási technikák és hatalmi játszmák. A Habsburg és az 
Oszmán Birodalom közötti határ meghúzása a karlócai békét követően” [Negotia-
tion techniques and power plays. Drawing a border between the Habsburg and Ot-
toman empires following the peace treaty of Karlowitz], Századok 140, 6 (2006), 
1475–1502.  
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date, he made an accurate and detailed plan66 of the route to be traversed 
in both the Southern Land (Hung. Délvidék) and in Transylvania, identify-
ing the most important tasks to be carried out in each locality. 
During the border inspection, Marsigli sent regular reports on the pro-
gress of the work and any problems that arose along the way or issues to 
be resolved. Besides these, he suggested draft measures to be taken for the 
strict military management of the newly reoccupied territories, the en-
forcement of state order (in his own words: “buon ordine”) and the protec-
tion of the recently defined border. He also outlined the possible economic 
and trade relations that could be entered into with the Ottomans. Marsigli 
attempted to reconcile the interests of two distinctly separate groups. The 
Merkantilpartei and the Militärpartei, taking into account both the eco-
nomic and military-protective points of view. Besides the reports and the 
responses to them, the material available to us comprises a small archival 
fond67 consisting of correspondence with the Ottomans,68 historical and 
geographical data collected locally, as well as a vast number of maps and 
drawings of the entire border region and the castles to be destroyed.69 
Marsigli kept in touch with the leading politicians in Vienna, the local im-
perial military commander and the Ottoman magistrates (including the pa-
shas of Bosnia and Temesvár/Timişoara) throughout. Since according to 
the peace agreement the old pre-war borders had to be maintained, Marsig-
li tried to track down the sources and people who could help him in this. 
For instance, at the Croatian border, Pavao Ritter Vitezović aided him.70 
Uncertainty was particularly great at the Transylvanian border region with 
regard to the previous and current borders of Moldavia, Wallachia and the 
                                                            
66 Progetto per l’esecuzione de’Confini accordati fra ambi gl’Imperi Cesareo ed 
Ottomano ne’Trattati di Pace Carloviz Dato li 29. novembre 1699 (BUB FM Ms. 
58). 
67 Marsigli prepared a summary volume of the whole thing: Acta executionis pacis 
(BUB FM Ms. 16), his aim in publishing it being to preserve the memory of this 
“glorious” period for posterity. Cf. S. Bene, “Acta Pacis.” 
68 Lettere Turche, con la traduzione, in Commissione de’Confini, vol. 15 (BUB 
FM Ms. 65). 
69 D. A. András, Térképek a félhold árnyékából [Maps from the shadow of the 
Crescent] (DVD, Budapest 2005). 
70 “an intellectual of encyclopaedic education and knowledge, a poet, scholar, 
printer, historian, the unifier of the Croatian literary language,” Bene, “Questions 
of the New Balcan Settlement,” 199; cf. id., “Illyria or What You Will: Luigi Fer-
dinando Marsigli and Pavao Ritter Vitezović’s ‘Mapping’ of the Borderlands Re-
captured from the Ottomans,” in Whose Love of Which Country? Composite States, 
National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe, 
ed. by B. Trencsényi and M. Zászkaliczky (Leiden 2010), 351–403. 
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Ottoman Empire (in the territory of the Banat of Temesvár). The Transyl-
vanian delegation, sent in to help, had no written documents whatsoever 
on the previous borders.71 Later, in order to clarify the situation, Marsigli 
made a map, on which he attempted to indicate the changing borders of 
the principality over time.72 He called upon another imperial military en-
gineer and mapmaker, also experienced in Transylvanian geopolitical is-
sues, Visconti Morandi, with whom he had worked previously. He also 
used several interpreters, themselves conducting negotiations with the Ot-
tomans as commissioners of the border demarcation delegation, who 
played a part in translating letters from the Ottoman side and in transacting 
personal meetings between the two parties.73  
Marsigli collected several volumes of material on Hungary and the 
whole Carpathian Basin, partly recording his own experiences, partly 
drawing on local sources.74 In fact, he had the opportunity to publish his 
                                                            
71 Finally, he managed to procure a report from István Naláczy, who was a member 
of the Transylvanian delegation sent out to help demarcate the border, which dis-
cussed the governance of Transylvania, its borders and the habits of its residents: 
“tanto sul governo e i confini, quanto su l’uso e costume degli abitanti” (Marsili, 
Relazioni dei confini, 400).  
72 Mappa Geographica, limites, Transilvaniam inter et Banatus Temesvariensem, 
qui, juxta Pacis Tabulas, priores antiqui esse debent, patuendas ostendens (BUB 
FM Ms. 49, f. 34r).  
73 Since Marsigli was never entirely satisfied with the young Luca[s Franz] Ja-
gelsky’s work, his later letters were all translated by another interpreter, Alvise 
Wolde. Jagelsky learned the Eastern languages in the Viennese school of Johann 
Baptist Podestà, formerly an interpreter in Constantinople, and he had belonged to 
a group of trainee interpreters to the War Council since 1693. Due to Wolde’s ex-
ceptional linguistic skills and his famous relative Marc’Antonio Mamucca della 
Torre, he joined the official service of the War Council and the emperor at the 
same time as Michele Tallman. 
74 Cf. E. Veress, A bolognai Marsigli iratok magyar vonatkozásai [Implications of 
Marsigli’s Bolognaise papers for Hungary] (Budapest 1906); but to name a few 
examples: Notitie geografiche e genealogiche dell’Ungheria raccolte dal Generale 
Co. Marsili (BUB FM Ms. 28); Descrittione naturale, civile e militare delle Misie, 
Dacie e Illirico libri quattordici (BUB FM Ms. 108); Epitome della ribellione 
dell’Ungheria con annesso il Prodromo del Protocollo de’moderni confini Cesarei 
Ottomanici (BUB FM Ms. 70, fasc.10); Primo Abozzo del compendio storico 
dell’Ungaria per servire d’introduzione al trattato: Acta Executionis Pacis fatto 
dal generale co(lonello) Marsili (BUB FM Ms. 117; published: L. F. Marsili, A 
Magyar Királyság történetének kivonata [An extract of the history of the Kingdom 
of Hungary], trans. by L. Nagy (Máriabesnyő and Gödöllő 2009); La popolazione 
di Transilvania composta di varie nationi, di diverse lingue, religioni, usi e vestiti 
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scientific observations during his lifetime.75 His image of the Hungarians 
was greatly determined by the mood of political circles in Vienna, follow-
ing which, Marsigli also claimed that the Hungarians inherited their pride, 
restlessness and their inclination for disgruntlement from the Scythians 
and the Tatars. Accordingly, the main aim was to integrate Hungary into 
the Habsburg Monarchy, which meant pledging themselves to Leopold’s 
authority and increased power.76  
Summary 
Marsigli, as we have seen, had an extensive network of contacts, and he 
used this personal network to gather and forward intelligence primarily on 
the Ottomans, but also the entire Balkan region and Hungary. He was dif-
ferent from his Italian contemporaries, who were Habsburg mercenaries, 
in that he always had the interests of Vienna in mind, though this only ap-
pears indirectly in his own memoirs, since his most important works in 
this respect appeared after his ignominious departure from the Habsburg 
army. From this perspective, naturally the Ottoman Empire is the enemy 
of Christianity and the representative of diversity to him. Despite the fact 
that he was deeply preoccupied with the possibility of the integration of 
the virtually clichéd “rebellious Hungarians” into the empire, Hungary as a 
factor did not play an independent role in his thinking. This principle was 
somewhat altered by his personal ties, especially the fact that he had much 
more subtle cultural knowledge and a more multilateral information net-
work than his contemporaries, since he had wide-ranging experience of the 
Ottomans and the entire Carpathian Basin. Though he did not belong to 
the paid spy network of the Habsburgs operating within the Ottoman Em-
pire, as a professional soldier in the Habsburg army, and a secret, or offi-
cial, diplomat, he was able to address his letters, reports, notes and rec-
ommendations directly to the narrow circle of policy makers. His data was 
collected with scholarly erudition and served the military and geopolitical 
interests of the Habsburg Empire and the expansion efforts of the 
Viennese court.  
                                                                                                                           
(BUB FM Ms. 15); Discorso intorno alla libreria famosa di Buda (BUB FM Ms. 
85, fasc. F). 
75 Danubius Pannonico-Mysicus, observationibus geographicis, astronomicis, hy-
drographicis, historicis, physicis perlustratus, vols. 1–6 (The Hague and Amster-
dam 1726). For the facsimile publication and translation of the first volume of the 
work known as Duna-monográfia [Danube monograph], cf. A. A. Deák, A Duna 
fölfedezése [The discovery of the Danube] (Budapest 2004).  
76 Cf. Nagy, Határok, vándorok, kémek. 
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In Marsigli’s case it is clear that, beyond the rhetoric and imperial prop-
aganda, the policies of the Papal State, the Venetian Republic and the 
Habsburg Empire were driven by a strong pragmatism. If we consider the 
cultural aspects of his diplomatic activities, Marsigli was not unsuccessful 
in his highly problematic relationship with the Ottomans: his intelligence 
gathering trips were a success, even if his diplomatic missions were not 
always so, due to the given political situation. His most important and 
most difficult mandate was the demarcation of the border, and this was the 
height of Count Marsigli’s career and service to the Habsburgs. The Italian 
expert enjoyed full imperial confidence and through this commission was 
able to combine all his previous activities: gathering intelligence, diplo-
matic and political work and scientific data collection. 

